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Introduction 
 For over two decades human rights clauses (HRCs) have been incorporated in the 
international agreements of the European Union (the EU or Union). It is therefore not surprising to 
find such clauses in the new generation of Association Agreements (AAs) concluded with Ukraine, 
Georgia and Moldova in 2014.  At the same time there are a number of reasons why these particular 1
HRCs merit further attention.  
 Firstly, the Eastern AAs should be analysed within a specific policy narrative. They are a 
“new generation” of bilateral instruments in the EU Eastern neighbourhood, conceived within the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The latter emerged in 2003 to react to the accession round 
in 2004 and to advance the EU security objectives across the Union’s borders.  The ENP has been a 2
vast initiative in terms of its content and its geographic coverage, aiming to integrate the Eastern 
and Southern neighbours economically and politically.  From the moment of its inception, it has 3
* The author is grateful to Professor Panos Koutrakos, Dr. Ioannis Kalpouzos and the ELRev anonymous reviewer for 
their comments and suggestions regarding the previous drafts of the article.  
 Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 1
States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [2014] OJ L261; Association Agreement between the European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Moldova, of the other part [2014] OJ L260; Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part [2014] OJ L161. 
 N. Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU: A Legal Analysis (Oxford, 2
Hart, 2014), pp. 1-5, 23-28.
 On ENP more generally see M. Cremona, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: More than a Partnership?” in Marise 3
Cremona (ed), Developments in EU External Relations Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008); M. Cremona and C. Hillion, 
‘L’Union Fait La Force? Potential and Limitations of the ENP as an Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy’ in 
Nathaniel Copsey and A Mayhew (eds), European Neighbourhood Policy: The Case of Europe [2006 ] 1 SEI Seminar 
Papers Series Number 20; B. Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A 
Paradigm for Coherence (London: Routledge, 2014); Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Democratic Values of the EU (2014).
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placed an emphasis on human rights and democratic conditionality,  finding continuity in the 4
regional branching of the policy.   5
 Secondly, it is important to note that the Eastern AAs were concluded after the ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty. When the HRCs became a fixture of EU foreign policy in the 1990s, the EU 
emphasis on human rights was focused more externally than internally.  The protection of human 6
rights in relations with third countries was considered necessary to demonstrate the Union’s own 
commitment to this principle.  Currently the EU’s external image is more in accord with its internal 7
development, respect for human rights being an entrenched “constitutional principle” of the EU.  8
This is part of a wider political evolution reflected in reinforced commitments to human rights and 
democratic principles, outlined respectively in art. 6 and arts. 9-12 of the post-Lisbon Treaty on 
European Union (TEU).  In addition, this evolution has found continuity in the post-Lisbon foreign 9
policy framework. 
 By establishing a common list of foreign policy objectives, Art. 21 creates a multifaceted 
and positive approach to democracy and human rights promotion demanding action on behalf of the 
EU.  Art. 3(5) TEU supports this rationale by adding further dimensions to the EU’s goals, 10
including the “upholding and promoting” of its values. The external policies of the Treaty on the 
 Communication on Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern 4
neighbours COM(2003) 104 final, p. 4; Communication on European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper 
COM(2004) 373 final, pp. 12-13.
 Communication on Eastern Partnership COM(2008) 823 final, pp. 3-4. 5
 P. Alston and J. Weiler, “An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: the European Union and Human 6
Rights” in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 7; E. Fierro, The EU’s Approach to 
Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), pp. 82-84. On the incoherence of the 
internal and external human rights policy more generally see A. Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 79-127, 193-204. 
 M. Nowak, “Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry to, and Full Participation in the EU” in Philip Alston 7
(ed) The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 698; Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights 
Conditionality in Practice (2003), p. 230.
 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of 8
the European Communities (402/05) [2008] E.C.R I-06351 at [285].
 [2009] OJ C115/19; Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU (2014), 9
pp. 95-124. 
 For further analysis of art. 21 TEU see L. Bartels, “A Model Human Rights Clause for the EU’s International Trade 10
Agreements” (German Institute for Human Rights and Misereor, 2014), pp. 15-18; P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p. 96; Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the 
EU (2014), pp. 15-23. 
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Functioning of the EU (TFEU) follow the same objectives.  This can be viewed an example of 11
“constitutional fetishism” — “the belief that social reality can effectively be steered by just putting 
words in a constitutional document”  — particularly in the context of criticism of the EU’s 12
political conditionality.  13
 Against this background, it can be seen that there is a certain novelty in the Eastern HRCs, 
which can be ascribed, inter alia, to the specific legal and political context within which the AAs 
have been concluded. In this article, therefore, the content of the HRCs with reference to the 
essential element clause is considered with respect to previous practice. Next, it is argued that the 
functions of the HRCs have a wider scope than the suspension mechanism. First, the relevant AAs 
are analysed in order to expose the broader political and legal contexts of the new HRCs.  
Eastern AAs: Legal and Political Context 
 The Eastern AAs are the first post-ENP agreements, concluded in the Eastern 
neighbourhood in an atmosphere of hostile relations with Russia. This created a new emphasis on 
the issue of values. From the moment of its inception, the ENP incorporated the concept of value 
promotion as an indirect means of achieving security and stability.  Democracy and human rights 14
promotion have featured as “shared values” on the basis of the enlargement experience.  This 15
“value dimension” has been referred to as a significant development, introduced by the ENP in 
contradistinction to previous EU policies.  16
 Arts. 205, 207 and 208 TFEU [2012] OJ C 326/47. 11
 B. De Witte, “Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations” in Marise Cremona and 12
Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart, 2008), pp. 12-13.
 M. Emerson et al,  “The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its 13
Neighbourhood” [2005] CEPS Working Document No 223, p. 3; S. Keukeleire and J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign 
Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), p. 334; R. Youngs, “Normative Dynamics and Strategic 
Interests in the EU’s External Identity” (2004) 42 J.C.M.S. 415, p. 431; S. Lucarelli, “Values, Identity and Ideational 
Shocks in the Transatlantic Rift” (2006) 9 J.I.R.D. 304, p. 320;  K.E. Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the 
EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?” (1998) 3 E.F.A.R. 253, pp. 254, 272, 273; E. Johansson-Nogues, 
“The (Non-) Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional 
Actor?” (2007) 7 E.P.E.R. 181, pp.185-186.
 Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU (2014), pp. 23-33, 73-84.14
 Copenhagen European Council Conclusions of December 12-13, 2002, para. 22.15
 G. Bosse, “Values in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy: Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent Policy?” (2007) 16
7 E.P.E.R. 38, p. 39.
 3
 The language of shared values implies universality of EU values to avoid accusations of 
neo-colonialism.  The presumption of universality is supported by references to various 17
international and regional documents in ENP instruments, including the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) incorporated within the policy, and the ENP Action Plans — the 
main policy documents setting priorities for cooperation. However, the vagueness of shared values 
suggested an inherent flexibility, particularly when monitoring adherence to those very values.  18
Moreover, the notion of values being “shared” with certain autocratic neighbours appeared to 
discredit the EU and undermine the ENP conditionality.   19
 Although the ENP included negative conditionality, such as withdrawal of aid, economic 
sanctions etc., its overall approach was predominantly positive in that political and economic 
incentives were provided for undertaking reforms.  Negative conditionality was implied in the 20
HRCs of the PCAs and the Euro--Mediterranean Agreements.   It was incorporated also in the ENP 21
 P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, “Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the Neighbouring 17
Countries of the European Union?” (2011) 36 E.L.R. 688, p. 693; P. Leino, “The Journey towards All that is Good and 
Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law” in Marise 
Cremona and Bruno de Witte, (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart, 2008), p. 
263.
 See further P. Leino and R. Petrov, “Between ‘Common Values’ and Competing Universals—The Promotion of the 18
EU’s Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy” (2009) 15 E.L.J. 654, p.659; Ghazaryan, The 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU (2014), pp. 154-158.
 Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU (2014), pp. 76-78.19
 Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU (2014), pp. 76-81.20
 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one 21
part, and Russia, of the other [1997] OJ L327; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other [1999] OJ L239/3; 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other [1999] OJ L246/3; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Georgia, of the other [1999] OJ 
L205/3; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other [1998] OJ L181; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other [1998] OJ L049; Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association with between the European Community and its Member States, 
of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part [2005] OJ L265; Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part [2004] OJ L304; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, of the other part [2002] OJ L129; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part [2000] OJ 
L147; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part [2000] OJ L070; Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part  [1998] OJ L97.
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2006-2014 financial instrument.  As far as positive conditionality is concerned, in addition to 22
establishing a positive list of actions, the ENP has assimilated other policy instruments, including 
CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) political dialogues, human rights dialogues and the 
operations of relevant sub-committees within the bilateral agreements.  A similarly positive 23
approach is found in the Eastern Partnership framework, which added a pluralistic dimension to 
ENP cooperation by establishing, inter alia, a multilateral platform to promote democracy.   24
As well as being the first post-ENP agreements, the Eastern AAs were the first post-Lisbon 
agreements in this region. All three agreements use the novel combination of arts. 31(1) and 37 
TEU and 217 TFEU as a joint legal basis.  Although the Commission suggested only art. 217 25
TFEU (together with the relevant provisions of art. 218 TFEU)  as a legal basis for the Georgian 
and the Moldovan AAs,  the latter followed the Ukrainian example which already used the novel 26
combination noted above. The specific circumstances of the EU-Ukraine agreement should be 
highlighted here: the political chapters were signed separately in March 2014,  where the CFSP 27
legal basis was viewed as necessary. Its component on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) was signed in June at the same time as the rushed signing of the Georgian and 
 Art. 28, Regulation 1638/2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and 22
Partnership Instrument [2006] OJ L310/1. 
 See further EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues with Third Countries, p. 5; Joint staff working document on 23
implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, Regional report: Eastern Partnership SWD(2014) 99 
final, p. 6. 
 Communication on Eastern Partnership, pp. 3, 4, 9-10.24
 All three agreements also rely on art. 218(5) and (8) TFEU; Decision 2014/295 on the signing, on behalf of the 25
European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as 
regards the Preamble, Article 1, and Titles I, II and VII thereof [2014] OJ L161; Decision 2014/494 on the signing, on 
behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Atomic 
Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [2014] OJ L261; Decision 
2014/492 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement 
between the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Moldova, of the other part [2014] OJ L260.
 Proposal for a Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the 26
Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part COM(2014) 0157 final; Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the conclusion of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part COM(2014) 0149 final.
 Decision 2014/295. 27
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Moldovan agreements in spite of these countries’ shortfalls in fulfilling the political criteria set out 
in the ENP documents.  28
This hastiness could be explained with reference to the political antagonism existing in the 
region. Just before the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership in November 2013, it transpired 
that Armenia had opted out of the AA, and Ukraine declared that it would refrain from signing.  29
Both developments were clearly linked to the pressure exerted by Russia to join an alternative 
integration project, namely the anticipated Eurasian Economic Union.  The signature of the AAs in 30
the Eastern neighbourhood was viewed by Russia primarily as an expression of the EU’s 
encroachment on Russia’s historic and geographic spheres of influence.  Russian concerns were, 31
inter alia, linked to the nature of the cooperation offered by the EU. These became more pressing 
after the initiation of the Eastern Partnership and the concretisation of the type of agreements on 
offer.   
The AAs imply “special, privileged links” whereby the party “must, at least to a certain 
extent, take part in the [Union] system”.  The partaking in the Union one way or the other is 32
indicative of the process of “gradual integration”.  In this case, it takes the form of political and 33
economic cooperation, including a DCFTA as its trade component. The stated objectives of the 
 Joint staff working document on implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Georgia: Progress in 28
2012 and recommendations for action SWD(2013) 90 final, 20 March 2013, pp. 4-8; Joint staff working document, 
Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Republic of Moldova: Progress in 2012 and 
recommendations for action SWD(2013) 80 final, pp. 5-8. 
 European Voice, September 3, 2013; 27 November 2013. 29
 Declaration on Eurasian Economic Integration 2011; The Voice of Russia, May 29, 2014. For the chronology of the 30
Eurasian integration project see R. Dragneva, “The Legal and Institutional Dimensions of the Eurasian Customs Union” 
in Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk (eds), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2013).
 On the implications of the ENP for EU-Russia relations see H. Haukkala and A. Moshes, “Beyond ‘Bing Bang’: The 31
Challenges of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy in the East” (The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2004), pp. 
5-6, 19; R. Dannreuther, “Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy” (2006) 11 
E.F.A.R. 183, pp. 185; S. Keukeleire and J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 274; K. Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy” (2005) 81 
International Affairs 757, pp. 759-760; R. Aliboni, “The Geopolitical Implications of the ENP” (2005) 10 E.F.A.R. 1, p. 
14; F. Tassinari, “A Riddle Inside an Enigma: Unwrapping the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership” (2005) 40 The 
International Spectator  45, p. 51.
 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd (12/86) [1987] E.C.R. 3719 at [9]. 32
 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006), p. 238; J. Klabbers, “Volkerrechtsfreundlich? 33
International Law and the Union Legal Order” in Panos Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political 
Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), p. 112. 
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Eastern AA include “gradual rapprochement” and “close and privileged links” with Ukraine,  and 34
“political association and economic integration” based on “close links” with Moldova and 
Georgia.  Thus, these agreements represent the most extensive cooperation offered to the non-35
candidate neighbours to date. 
 The extent of the cooperation is confirmed in the preamble, in which the countries are 
defined as “European”  and their “European choice” acknowledged. Although the ENP Action 36
Plans made references to the neighbours’ “European aspirations”, it can be argued that the 
preambular statements in the AA counter the exclusionary logic of the ENP. The latter also seems to 
be corroded by the affirmation that the agreements will not prejudice further development in 
relations between the parties. Taking into account the difficult choice Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia had to make between EU integration and maintaining, improving or stabilising their ties 
with Russia (as has increasingly become the case with all three states), this can be viewed as a 
reassurance on behalf of the EU aimed at seeking the neighbours’ engagement in the policy,  rather 37
than a serious promise of membership.  
 The preambles of the Eastern AAs echo the ENP’s and the Lisbon Treaty’s orientation 
towards value promotion. Although certain distinctions are noted, the agreements have in common 
the rhetoric on shared values “at the heart of political association and economic integration”  or as 38
the basis of cooperation.  Unlike the Georgian and Moldovan AAs, the preamble of the EU-39
Ukraine agreement emphasises the essential element clause and links progress in cooperation, inter 
alia, to the respect for common values, which has been described as “strict conditionality”.  Such a 40
view is supported by a further addition to the preamble in which many values — such as democratic 
principles, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms — are 
 Art. 1(2)(a) of EU-Ukraine AA.34
 Arts. 1(2)(a) of EU-Moldova and EU-Georgia AA. 35
 “Eastern European” in case of Georgia. 36
 It is argued elsewhere that the ultimate aim of the ENP is to seek the neighbours’ engagement, Ghazaryan, The 37
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU (2014), pp. 177-184.
 Preamble, EU-Moldova and EU-Georgia AAs.38
 Preamble, EU-Ukraine AA. 39
  G. Van der Loo, P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an 40
Innovative Legal Instrument” [2014] 9 EUI Working Papers, p. 3. 
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listed.  A reinforced emphasis on the international commitments of the partners in the area of 41
political reform can also be noted as a common feature. Although not novel in itself, the Eastern 
AAs make more extensive reference to the UN Charter, OSCE documents, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
than do previous neighbourhood agreements.  These references constitute part of the so-called 42
“standard” HRC discussed next.  
The Essential Elements and their Normative Framework 
 The EU’s practice has evolved from rhetorical statements to standard HRCs in more than 
120 international agreements  and to cross-referencing of agreements containing HRCs.  Although 43 44
earlier “programmatic principles” and the “basis clauses” introduced human rights to the 
agreements,  they were not considered to be “essential to the accomplishment of the object or 45
purpose of the treaty”.  46
 A shift towards including HRCs in international agreements in development policy 
transpired in the early 1990s due to inter-institutional momentum,  following the earlier trends of 47
 Preamble, EU-Ukraine AA.41
 References to international documents can be found in the preambles of other agreements, including the PCAs; or the 42
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, 
and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part [2013] OJ L278. 
 Leino, “The Journey towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ as Guiding 43
Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law” in EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (2008), p. 263. 
 L. Bartels, “The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and Investment Agreements” 44
European Parliament, February 2014, p. 7; L. Bartels, “Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU 
Free Trade Agreements” (2013) 40 L.I.E.I. 297, p. 299.
 For this typology see E. Riedel and M. Will, “Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC” in Philip 45
Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp. 726-728.
 Art. 60(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 46
Many provisions of the Vienna Convention are a part of customary international law; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
[1997] I.C.J. Reports 66 at [109].
 Communication on human rights, democracy and development cooperation policy SEC(91) 61; Luxembourg 47
European Council, Declaration on Human Rights, Bull EC 6-1991; Resolution of the Council on human rights, 
democracy and development, Bull EC 11 -1991, 122; L. Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International 
Agreements (Oxford: OUP, 2005), pp. 17-22. 
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linking development policy to human rights,  and reflecting the “international consensus” on 48
providing aid on the basis of conditionality.  In the neighbourhood, this was also linked to the 49
collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc,  prompting the EU to 50
advance a values agenda through the Declaration on the Recognition of New States.  The latter 51
paved the way for the inclusion of HRCs — now the essential element clauses — in agreements 
with the newly independent countries by demanding respect for provisions of the UN Charter, 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, “especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights”.  These agreements included most Europe Agreements (EAs) with Central and 52
Eastern European states,  and the PCAs. 53
 Williams, EU Human Rights Policies (2004), pp. 27-33; Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s 48
International Agreements (2005), pp. 7-17. 
 Lister as cited in O. Elgström, “EU Policy on Economic Partnership Agreements: Trade… and Aid?” in D.C. Thomas 49
(eds), Making EU Foreign Policy: National Preferences, European Norms and Common Policies (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2011), pp. 133-134. 
 Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (2003), pp. 71-80.50
 Declaration on the guidelines on the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union 1991; 51
General Affairs Council EC-Bulletin 5-1992, 1.2.13.
 Riedel and Will, “Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC” in The EU and Human Rights (1999), p. 52
728.
 The first EAs with Hungary and Poland did not contain HRCs. All other EAs concluded after 1992 include such 53
clauses following the 1991 Declarations and the 1992 Council statement on the inclusion of such clauses in the 
agreements with the OSCE states; Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part [1994] OJ L358; Europe 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and Romania, of the other part [1994] OJ L357; Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part [1994] OJ L360; 
Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one 
part, and the Slovak Republic, of the other part [1994] OJ L359; Europe Agreement establishing an association between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part 
[1992] OJ L403; Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Latvia, of the other part [1992] OJ L403; Europe Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Lithuania, of the other part [1992] OJ L403; Lisbon European Council Bull EC 6-1992; K. E. Smith, The Making of EU 
Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999), pp. 96-98; Bartels, Human Rights 
Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (2005), pp. 22-23. 
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 The essential element clause is at the foundation of the standard HRC, which includes a 
preambular reference and a provision on the suspension of the agreement.  In certain cases, a Joint 54
Declaration accompanies the agreements, linking the essential element clause directly to the 
suspension mechanism.  The “essential” elements in effect transplanted the rationale of art. 60 of 55
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to EU international agreements in place of the rebus 
sic stantibus principle in art. 62.  The standard model can be found in all three Eastern AAs, in 56
which the essential element is found under the Title on General Principles. The international 
instruments constituting the basis of these provisions should now be discussed prior to analysing the 
essential elements.  
 In all three agreements a somewhat extensive list of international instruments constitutes the 
basis for the essential elements that the parties must respect in their domestic and foreign policies.  57
References to specific international documents are at odds with the so-called tout court approach 
containing no references to international human rights instruments.  The latter due to its abstract 58
nature allows a party with more leverage to determine what it is “aimed at” at the stage of 
implementation.  Although references to international instruments vary depending on the country 59
or region concerned,  the UDHR, considered a central feature of the standard or “model” clause, is 60
 Riedel and Will, “Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC” in The EU and Human Rights (1999), 54
pp. 731-732; A. Rosas, “The European Union and Fundamental Rights/Human Rights” in Catarina Krause and Martin 
Scheinin (eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Åbo Akademi University: Institute for Human 
Rights, 2009), p. 467; M. Bulterman, Human Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues 
or Virtual Reality (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2001), p. 157; Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s 
International Agreements (2005), p. 23. 
 For instance, the PCAs. 55
 Bartels, “Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements” (2013) 40 L.I.E.I. 56
297, p. 298; Riedel and Will, “Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC” in The EU and Human Rights 
(1999), pp. 729-730; Bulterman, Human Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or 
Virtual Reality (2001), p. 221; V. Miller, “The Human Rights Clauses in the EU’s External Agreements” [2004] House 
of Commons Research Paper 04/33, p. 13.
 Common art. 2. 57
 Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (2003), p. 231.58
 Leino, “The Journey towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ as Guiding 59
Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law” in EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (2008), pp. 265, 
279.
 References to UDHR for instance can be found in Euro-Med Agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco. 60
The PCAs make references to the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.
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most commonly referred to, and, as with the UN Charter, it is viewed as a testament to the 
universality of the principles promoted.  As noted above, this indicates the EU’s universality 61
approach,  also found in art. 21(1) and 21(2)(c) TEU. In addition to the UDHR, the Eastern clauses 62
make references to the ECHR, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter of the OSCE – all 
regional documents. It is noteworthy that, in spite of the multilayered approach to human rights 
protection in art. 6 TEU, no references are made to EU standards as general principles of law or as 
established in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
 Thus, the normative underpinning to the Eastern HRCs is more extensive than in other 
neighbourhood agreements. For instance, most Euro-Med agreements refer only to the UDHR in 
their essential element clause   – a “compromise” between tout court and a very loaded content.  63 64
As one would not expect to find references to European regional instruments in the Euro-Med 
agreements, a comparison with other European neighbourhood agreements is more apposite. An 
analysis of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) reveals that the Eastern HRCs are 
more onerous than their counterparts with existing candidate countries, not all of which contain 
references to the ECHR.  Those with Croatia and Macedonia have no such references, even though 65
 Rosas, “The European Union and Fundamental Rights/Human Rights” in International Protection of Human Rights: 61
A Textbook (2009), pp. 466-467; A. Rosas, “The European Union and International Human Rights Instruments” in 
Vincent Kronenberger (ed.), The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press), p. 61; B. de Witte, “The EU and the International Legal Order: The Case of Human Rights” 
in Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders. Policy Interconnections between 
the EU and the Rest of the World (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p. 141.
 EU Annual Report on human rights and democracy in the world in 2013, COHOM 109, 11107/14, p. 34; Leino, “The 62
Journey towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ as Guiding Principles of EU 
Foreign Relations Law” in EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (2008), p. 260. 
 Art. 2 of Euro-Med Agreements with Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco. The essential elements of the Euro-63
Med Agreements with Israel and Tunisia make no references to any international documents. 
 Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (2003), p. 237.64
 Only the most recent SAAs do; art. 2, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities 65
and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part [2009] OJ L107; Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Montenegro, of the other part [2010] OJ L108; SAA with Serbia.
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both countries were already members of the Council of Europe at the time of the conclusion of the 
agreement.  Hence, there is no obvious rationale for such a lack of consistency.  66
 The inclusion of the ECHR is notable in that no other document cited in the essential 
element clause is directly binding. As part of customary international law, many UDHR clauses 
would be binding on members of the international community,  including the EU.  But while not 67 68
all UDHR clauses are recognised as customary international law, by referring to the latter in the 
HRC it is ensured that the document is binding in its entirety.  The reliance on other non-binding 69
instruments is a means of “an indirect strengthening of international human rights standards, as they 
add another enforcement mechanism to otherwise ‘toothless’ international supervisory bodies”.  70
However, the ECHR is the only instrument to create directly binding legal obligations. It has its 
own enforcement mechanisms, and the breach of the ECHR might lead to the loss of the Council of 
Europe membership. In this respect, the Eastern HRCs are the strictest, particularly in comparison 
with the Euro-Med agreements, since the scope of the regional European instruments is wider than 
the UDHR.  71
 While the Eastern HRCs have a clear normative scope, it has been argued in general that a 
broad normative framework causes uncertainty regarding the precise standard being promoted.  72
Conversely, the inclusion of a phrase on “other human rights instruments” could be considered a 
positive evolution, allowing the HRC normative basis to be updated in line with the emerging 
 Macedonia and Croatia joined the Council of Europe in 1995 and 1996 respectively. 66
See art. 2, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part [2006] L26; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
of the other part [2004] OJ L84. 
 De Witte, “The EU and the International Legal Order: The Case of Human Rights” in Beyond the Established Legal 67
Orders. Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (2011), pp. 141-142.
 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz  (C-162/96) [1996]  E.C.R. I-03655 at [45-46]. 68
 L. Bartels, “A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Clauses in the European Union’s Euro-Mediterranean Association 69
Agreements” (2004) 9 Mediterranean Politics 368, p. 374. 
 F. Hoffmeister, “The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law” in Marise Cremona(ed), Developments in EU 70
External Relations Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p. 114.
 Bartels, “The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and Investment 71
Agreements” (2014), p. 9. 
 Nogueras and Martinez as cited in Williams, EU Human Rights Policies (2004), p. 41.72
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practice.  Such a novel approach can be found in the Ukrainian AA, where the HRC refers to 73
“other relevant human rights instruments” in addition to those mentioned above, thus rendering the 
list open-ended. This is not the only aspect of the Ukrainian HRC that stands out from its 
counterparts. 
 With respect to the essential elements, the Eastern clauses include democratic principles and 
human rights in line with common practice, while expanding the scope by the addition of 
fundamental freedoms. In EU human rights jargon the term “fundamental rights” is used,  while 74
“human rights and fundamental freedoms” are more in keeping with ECHR jargon.  
 Essential elements can also include the rule of law,  or respect for the principles of 75
international law. The latter can be seen in PCAs with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, for which 
an explanation was found in the outstanding conflicts in the region.  The PCAs also incorporated 76
the principles of a market economy as an essential element, hinting at not only the communist past 
of the countries concerned,  but also their participation in the OSCE.  While the broadening of the 77 78
scope of the essential elements provisions has been criticised for discrediting the “essential” nature 
of these elements,  it does not deprive the latter of their “essential” status. Instead, it provides a 79
wider ground for claiming a breach of essential element provision from the perspective of the 
suspension mechanism. One might even suggest that the closer the agreements to the EU, 
geographically or politically, the broader the scope of the essential element clauses. In contrast to 
the SAAs (political proximity) and PCAs (geographic proximity), the Euro-Med agreements make 
 Art. 1, Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 73
of Korea, on the other part [2013] OJ L20; Bartels, “The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in 
Trade and Investment Agreements” (2014), pp. 9, 14-15. 
 Art. 6 TEU and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/389.74
 See for instance art. 2, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 75
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part [2009] OJ L107/166.
 See for instance art. 2 of PCAs with South Caucasian countries; Riedel and Will, “Human Rights Clauses in External 76
Agreements of the EC” in The EU and Human Rights (1999), p. 743.
 Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (2003), p. 235. 77
 Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (2005), p. 27. 78
 Bulterman, Human Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or Virtual Reality 79
(2001), p. 161. 
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no references to the rule of law, principles of international law or the market economy.  Thus, the 80
expansion of the essential elements in the Eastern AAs represents an interesting variation. 
 All three provisions feature an essential element of non-proliferation of weapons in line with 
the 2003 Council Common Position.  While this can be perceived as an example of mainstreaming 81
this position in the neighbourhood, no Euro-Med agreement concluded after 2003 has such an 
essential element. In other agreements the issue of non-proliferation surfaced only as part of the 
political dialogue.  This addition in the Eastern AAs can be explained perhaps by the priority that 82
the EU has given the Eastern neighbourhood, including Russia, in this domain.  83
 The rule of law is another element in the General Principles of the Eastern AAs.  Ordinarily, 
when rule of law is included as an essential element no further explanations are provided as to its 
meaning.  This appears to be the case in the Ukrainian essential element clause, which, with 84
democratic principles, human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law emulates most closely 
the membership political criteria found in arts. 2 and 49 TEU. The Ukrainian HRC is widened 
further to contain the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and 
independence as essential elements. This unprecedented addition can be interpreted as an 
expression of the EU’s support of Ukraine in view of the political situation and the Russian 
annexation of Crimea.  The EU has been unequivocal in its condemnation of the illegal referendum 85
 See for instance art. 2 of Euro-Med Agreement with Algeria; Euro-Med Agreement with Egypt; Euro-Med 80
Agreement with Jordan.
 Common Position 2003/805/CFSP of 17 November 2003 on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral 81
agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery [2003] OJ L302/34; 
M. Cremona, “Values in EU Foreign Policy” in Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the Established 
Legal Orders. Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (Oxford: Hart, 2011), p. 305. 
 See art. 4, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities 82
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the other part [2009] OJ L350/3; arts. 4-5 of 
Euro-Med Agreement with Syria, not signed. Council of the European Union http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
srv?l=EN&f=ST%209921%202009%20INIT [Accessed February 13, 2015]. 
 R. Aliboni, “The Non-Proliferation Clause in a Preventive Perspective” [2004] Conflict in FOCUS No. 4, pp. 2-3. 83
 Pech finds exceptions in the Cotonou Agreement, L. Pech, “Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: On the EU’s Limited 84
Contribution to the Shaping of an International Understanding of the Rule of Law” in Dimitry Kochenov and Fabian 
Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), p. 114. 
 Following a referendum in Crimea on 16 of March on the issue of acceding to Russia, an Accession Treaty was 85
signed to include the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol as part of the Russian Federation on 18th of March 2014.
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on independence and the subsequent annexation of the peninsula.  Although the rationale of this 86
addition is obvious, its function is less so: a provision in a bilateral agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine cannot be relied upon to reprimand a third party. Instead, the essential element in the PCA 
with Russia could conceivably be deployed, as it binds Russia to “regard as inviolable” the frontiers 
and to “respect the territorial integrity” of other participating states, including the Ukraine, as 
established in the OSCE Helsinki Final Act.   87
 In comparison, in the Georgian and the Moldovan AAs the rule of law is not one of the 
essential elements. Instead it is stipulated in a different paragraph of the same article under General 
Principles, framed in a language of “reaffirming respect” for rule of law and good governance.  In 88
contradistinction to the Ukrainian AA, further clarifications to the meaning of the rule of law are 
provided with reference to partners’ international obligations in the UN, the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE. Although in the case of Moldova this is non-specific, the Georgian AA ties the rule of 
law to a wider international context, linking it to the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, inviolability of borders and independence.  None of these feature as essential elements, 89
as in the case of Ukraine, but serve merely as general principles, which can be justified by the 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Their exclusion from the essential element clause might 
perhaps be explained by a less pressing political situation around those conflicts. Internally, the 
commitment to the rule of law is specified in relation to good governance, the fight against 
corruption, organised crime, terrorism, and so on.   90
 It should be also noted that the Moldovan and Georgian agreements, unlike their Ukrainian 
counterpart, provide for a commitment to a free market economy, sustainable development and 
effective multilateralism under the General Principles, albeit outside the scope of the essential 
elements. Although in the past the principle of a free market economy constituted part of the 
essential elements in some agreements, as noted above, the reference to sustainable development 
and effective multilateralism is rather new. In the PCAs and the SAAs, the principle of a market 
 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of March 17, 2014, para. 1; European Council Conclusions of March 20-21. 86
2014, para. 29. 
 The Helsinki Final Act is one of the documents referred to in the essential elements clause in art. 2 of the PCA with 87
Russia.
 Arts. 2(3) of EU-Moldova AA and EU-Georgia AA. 88
 Art. 2(3) of EU-Georgia AA. 89
 Art. 2(3) and (4) of EU-Georgia AA. 90
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economy as part of the essential element clause was based on the CSCE Bonn document,  which 91
sets “sustainable economic growth” – akin to sustainable development – as an objective. As to 
effective multilateralism, one might suggest it refers to the WTO membership of the parties 
concerned. Ultimately, these principles are not part of the essential element clause, and, like the rule 
of law only constitute part of the General Principles. These reiterate the commitments of the parties, 
but do not have the same status as essential elements. In comparison, the Ukrainian AA provides for 
a separate article within the General Principles, emphasising the importance of the free market 
economy, rule of law, good governance, the fight against corruption and trans-national organised 
crime and terrorism, the promotion of sustainable development and effective multilateralism.  92
 Thus in all three cases the General Principles have been expanded beyond the essential 
element clause, distinguishing between “hard core common values” and “other general principles” 
important to the parties.  However, the variations between the Ukrainian AA and the Georgian and 93
Moldovan AAs demonstrate the flexible and somewhat arbitrary nature of this distinction. 
Ultimately, judging by their normative framework and the list of essential elements, it can be 
concluded that the Eastern clauses impose more onerous obligations than other agreements in the 
neighbourhood. Moreover, the Ukrainian essential element clause demonstrates that the scope of the 
provision can be extended to make a political point for the notice of a third party, leading us to 
question the functions of these provisions.  
The Functions of HRCs and the Suspension of the Agreement 
The functions of the HRCs are usually linked to the non-execution clause, which provides 
inter alia for the possibility of suspending the agreement in case of a breach of its essential 
elements. The need for such an intervention mechanism was exemplified in the EU by cases of 
 See for instance art. 2 of PCA with Ukraine, PCA with Moldova, SAA with Albania; and SAA with Serbia. 91
 Art. 3 of EU-Ukraine AA. 92
 Van der Loo et al, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument” [2014] 93
9 EUI Working Papers, p. 13. 
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reliance on general norms of international law to reprimand a party to a bilateral agreement.  The 94
non-execution clause constitutes an additional mechanism to the restrictive measures adopted under 
art. 215 TFEU, linking the CFSP to Common Commercial Policy.  In a modern HRC the non-95
execution provision with its suspension element has become so central that the clauses themselves 
have been considered to be “specific suspension mechanisms”.  However, this is rather unjustified 96
when taking into account the positive function of the HRCs. Both functions are considered in turn 
below. 
The Negative Function and Treaty Suspension 
 In modern HRCs, the rationale of art. 60 of the Vienna Convention is found in the non-
execution clause — part of the standard HRC. It should be noted that art. 60 operates subject to 
specific provisions in a treaty applicable in the event of a breach,  that is subject to the non-97
execution clauses. Previous agreements in the neighbourhood included the “Bulgarian” version of 
this clause,  which first appeared in the EA with Bulgaria ensuring conformity with art. 65 of the 98
Vienna Convention.  As opposed to the “Baltic” clause providing for immediate suspension in case 99
 These included erga omnes obligations or the principles of rebus sic stantibus; Hoffmeister, “The Contribution of EU 94
Practice to International Law” in Developments in EU External Relations Law (2008), p. 94; B. Brandtner and A. 
Rosas, “Trade Preferences and Human Rights” in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 
p. 704; Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (2005), pp. 19-21; Bulterman, 
Human Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or Virtual Reality (2001), pp. 26-27.
 Williams, EU Human Rights Policies (2004), p. 49; M. Cremona, “Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the 95
EC’s Trade Agreements” in Nicholas Emiliou and  David O’Keeffee (eds), The European Union and World Trade Law: 
After the GATT Uruguay Round (Chichester: Wiley, 1996), pp. 70, 75. 
On the role of Art. 215 TFEU see J. Larik, “Much More than Trade: The CCP in a Global Context” in Malcolm Evans 
and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders. Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest 
of the World (Oxford: Hart, 2011), pp. 29-30. On economic sanctions particularly see P. Koutrakos,Trade, Foreign 
Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart, 2001), pp. 67-91.
 Leino, “The Journey towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ as Guiding 96
Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law” in EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (2008), p. 261.
 Art. 60(4) of the Vienna Convention. 97
 PCAs, the Euro-Med Agreements, the EAs of the second round with the exception of the EAs with Poland and 98
Hungary.
 Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (2003), pp. 101, 218, 223; Bulterman, Human 99
Rights in the Treaty Relations of the European Community: Real Virtues or Virtual Reality (2001), p. 205. 
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of a breach of an agreement,  the “Bulgarian” clause places an emphasis on consultation by 100
allowing for “appropriate measures” to be taken following a certain procedure, whereby an 
immediate suspension would only be possible in cases of “special urgency”. Against this 
background, the non-execution clause in the Eastern AAs should be considered prior to analysing 
the practice of application of such provisions.  
 The Eastern AAs involve three identical provisions denoting three stages of performance. 
First, the parties are required to undertake “any general or specific measure” to fulfil their 
obligations.  Next, a mechanism is provided to settle disputes (with the exception of trade-related 101
disputes) in the Association Council with the assistance of the parties, until a binding decision has 
been adopted or the dispute comes to an end.  The option of suspension, within the possibility of 102
taking “appropriate measures”, appears as the last stage.   103
 Appropriate measures can be taken following a three-month period after a dispute settlement 
request has been made to the Association Council, and only if the complaining party still finds that 
the agreement is being breached. Priority is given to measures least disturbing the functioning of the 
agreement and as a general rule cannot include the suspension of trade relations. Furthermore, the 
relevant article provides for “exceptional cases”, including violation of the essential elements or 
denunciation of the agreement not sanctioned by the general rules of international law. The 
exceptional cases would therefore include all breaches of human rights, democratic principles and 
all other essential elements incorporated in the Eastern HRCs. Here, the three-month consultation 
period can be ignored, and “appropriate measures” can include the suspension of trade relations 
under Title IV of the agreement, in contrast with the non-fulfilment of other treaty obligations.  
 A number of observations can be made regarding the drafting of the clause. Firstly, the 
requirement to give priority to appropriate measures which least disturb the functioning of the 
agreement is common practice,  and as noted by Bartels is an odd remnant of the safeguard 104
 Included in the EAs with the Baltic states and Albania; Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality 100
in Practice (2003), pp. 218-222; Riedel and Will, “Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC” in The EU 
and Human Rights (1999), p. 729.
 See art. 476 of EU-Ukraine AA; art. 453 of EU-Moldova AA; art. 417 of EU-Georgia AA. 101
 Art. 477 of EU-Ukraine AA. 102
 Art. 478 of EU-Ukraine AA; art. 455 of EU-Moldova AA; art. 419 of EU-Georgia AA. 103
 For instance, art. 95 of PCA with Armenia; art. 98 of PCA with Georgia; art. 98 of  PCA with Azerbaijan. 104
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clauses in the EU’s trade agreements.  However, the Eastern non-execution clause omits 105
references, common elsewhere, to the need to abide by the rules of international law or the principle 
of proportionality.  In general, appropriate measures are said to allow for withdrawal of any 106
commitments under the agreement, particularly if they “would imperil [the EU’s] obligation” of 
value promotion.  Examples of appropriate measures are given in EU documents.  The 107 108
agreements themselves do not usually specify the appropriate measures, with the only exception 
being the suspension of treaty obligations in cases of special urgency, including for breaches of 
essential elements.  
 The question left open in the previous drafting practice was whether any violation of the 
essential element could be perceived as having special urgency. Some have interpreted this to imply 
that only exceptional circumstances of “serious violations” could be considered.  Rarely, the 109
agreements themselves provide a qualification, such as art. 86 of the Euro-Med Agreement with 
Egypt which refers to “grave” breaches. The most detailed and unusual explanation is found in art. 
96 of the Cotonou Agreement: special urgency includes “exceptional cases of particularly serious 
and flagrant violation of one of the essential elements … that require an immediate reaction”, 
whereby suspension is a means of last resort and can also be mitigated by consultation.  In this 110
respect, the Eastern AAs discard the familiar notion of special urgency in favour of “exceptional 
circumstances”, which resembles the definition of special urgency in art. 96 of the Cotonou 
Agreement and therefore supports the presumption that suspension is possible only in exceptional 
 Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (2005), pp. 24, 108-109.105
 These requirements can often be found in the Joint Declarations linking the essential provision with the non-106
execution clauses. See for instance Joint Declaration relating to art. 104 of Euro-Med Agreement with Algeria; art. 86 of 
the Euro-Med Agreement with Egypt. According to Bartels the reference to the principles of international law already 
assumes the principle of proportionality; Bartels, “A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Clauses in the European Union’s 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements” (2004) 9 Mediterranean Politics 368, p. 383.
 Bartels, “Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements” (2013) 40 L.I.E.I. 107
297, p. 311; Bartels, “The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and Investment 
Agreements” (2014), p. 11.
 Annex 2 of Communication on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements 108
between the Community and third countries COM(95) 216 final; EU Annual Report on Human Rights COHOM 29, 
13449/03, para. 4.1.5.
 Brandtner and Rosas, “Trade Preferences and Human Rights” in The EU and Human Rights (1999), p. 707.109
 Art. 96.1a(b) and (c), Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 110
States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part  [2010] OJ L287. 
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cases. Nevertheless, the Cotonou Agreement clarifications regarding the gravity of violation and the 
immediacy of the response required have not been replicated here. 
 Neither do the Eastern AAs escape criticism related to the lack of explicitness of the 
suspension procedures, particularly relevant in the event of a mixed agreement, whereby the 
involvement of the Member States would be required.  In particular, the Parliament has criticised 111
the lack of precision in the implementation procedure, which engenders a slow reaction from the 
Council and the Member States.  An unusually detailed suspension mechanism adopted for the 112
Cotonou Agreement was given a positive assessment on account of its “gradualism”,  but this is 113
an exception to the general rule. “Gradualism” refers to incremental steps in the procedure, 
including the exhaustion of dialogue options, holding consultations, and only then taking any 
drastic measures with set roles for the Council, Commission and the Member States. Fierro views 
this procedure to be positive in nature.  “Gradualism” applies not only to appropriate measures but 114
also to cases of special urgency: suspension is a means of last resort that can also be mitigated by 
consultation.  There is no similar procedure in the Eastern AAs, which would have facilitated the 115
application of the clause if necessary.  116
 Nonetheless, the possibility of suspension within the Eastern AAs should also be viewed as 
a means of last resort. Despite the lack of provision of a three-month period to resolve matters in the 
event of a breach of essential elements, the parties can nonetheless raise objections and resolve the 
issue by other, less disruptive means in a shorter time frame.  Yet the most peculiar aspect of the 117
 A. Rosas, “Mixed Union — Mixed Agreements” in Martti Koskenniemi (ed) International Law Aspects of the 111
European Union (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), p. 135; Brandtner and Rosas, “Trade Preferences and 
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non-execution clause is that, in “exceptional circumstances”, trade relations — more specifically 
the operation of the DCFTA — can be suspended, in contrast to non-fulfilment of other treaty 
obligations. It follows then that appropriate measures can also include the suspension of non-trade 
obligations, although, like any other appropriate measure this would be subject to the general rules 
described above.  118
 From one perspective, the threat of a DCFTA suspension has advantages. It would be a 
merely partial suspension of an agreement, which is more justifiable under international law.  119
However, even without such a specification, a partial suspension of treaty obligations would still be 
possible. Furthermore, it is said that the suspension of the agreement is a precondition for trade 
restrictions for the EU to avoid a breach of its obligations.  In the Eastern AAs, the EU essentially 120
does away with the need to suspend the agreement itself by providing for the option of directly 
enforcing trade restrictions. Nonetheless, the possible suspension of the trade-related part of the 
agreement would go against the very practice and preferences of the EU. Never before has the HRC 
has been used to justify restrictive trade measures.  What is the purpose of this provision, then? 121
One might argue that it creates a direct link between EU values and trade policy. However, an even 
more convincing rationale might lie in the ENP context within which the Eastern AAs have been 
concluded.  
 The significance of the threat of DCFTA suspension lies not so much in the potential 
interruption of trade relations, as in the possibility that the main incentive of the cooperation — the 
DCFTA itself — will be withdrawn. A DCFTA suspension would not preclude the political 
cooperation required to achieve the ENP objectives, but the extent to which a neighbour hopeful of 
membership would cooperate willingly in political and other spheres when the main incentive is put 
on hold must be doubted. Such an outcome would therefore go against the very nature of the 
proposed association and the ENP’s rationale of engagement, whereby sanctions necessarily lead to 
 For a comprehensive analysis see Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements 118
(2005). 
 Riedel and Will, “Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC” in The EU and Human Rights (1999), 119
p. 726. 
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2011), p. 27. 
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disengagement. Hence, applying the non-execution clauses in the Eastern AAs would be very 
unusual, particularly in view of past practice. 
 There have been only 23 recorded cases of negative application of the essential element 
clause, all concerning the Cotonou partner states.  In the EU immediate vicinity, blatant violations 122
of human rights and democratic principles have never led to the suspension mechanism under the 
essential elements clause.  The EU’s selection bias can be explained by the likelihood of success 123
of the sanctions  or by the economic and security interests of the EU. The suspension mechanism 124
is said to be reserved for countries that are economically or politically weak.  However, an 125
analysis by Saltnes of all the cases concerning the Cotonou Agreement suggests that the selection 
bias is not strictly linked to the aforementioned factors.  Saltnes demonstrates that the probability 126
of the application of the essential elements clauses is more closely linked to the particular essential 
element that is being breached; the majority of cases relate to serious breaches of democratic 
principles, the most important example of which is a coup d’état.  Mere breaches of human rights 127
on their own would not trigger the application of the clause.  This is the reason for branding these 128
provisions as “political clauses”.  129
 Halting a technical meeting with Uzbekistan in response to Andijan massacres was the only exception from this; 122
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 Besides, certain logic of “incrementalism” operates in this respect, whereby harsher 
sanctions would be spared in favour of limited pressure to induce the incumbent government to 
enter into dialogue and restore to changes.  For instance, sanctions targeting individuals are 130
preferred to those targeting the entire country, as seen most recently in relation to Russia,  131
although this is not without problems of its own.  Past and current examples, including Russian 132
involvement in Chechnya and in East Ukraine demonstrate that, although informed by the HRC, the 
EU fell short of undertaking all that was theoretically possible under this provision,  preferring 133
instead to rely on CFSP sanctions.   134
 This practice indicates that the application of appropriate measures under Eastern clauses 
can be expected rarely, and the suspension of the DCFTA even more so. The usefulness of trade 
sanctions has long been called into question.  Trade has rarely been relied upon to achieve other 135
objectives, and, in proposing sanctions, the EU prefers to defer to UN initiatives.  On the other 136
hand, as a “cross-sectoral” foreign policy objective,  democracy and human rights promotion are 137
binding in all areas of EU external action. Breaches of HRCs can affect any area of bilateral 
relations, be it political cooperation, development policy or trade links, rejecting the view that 
essential element clauses are “CFSP clauses”.  HRCs therefore provide a basis for using trade 138
restrictions to achieve objectives in other policy areas. The recent imposition of trade sanctions on 
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Russia in response to hostilities in Ukraine demonstrate a more independent stance by the EU on 
using trade sanctions to achieve wider policy goals,  albeit outside the scope of the essential 139
elements clause. 
 Negative conditionality in general has been criticised due to the flexibility and the political 
expediency inherent in its application.  Disadvantages, such as loss of leverage, punishment of the 140
population and strengthening of the ruling regime in the third country have been associated with 
negative conditionality.  Moreover, suspending trade with WTO members can be particularly 141
problematic.  It is hence understandable that the EU prefers to exercise leverage when starting 142
negotiations or concluding a new agreement, while refraining from its suspension after it has been 
adopted.   143
 Given the complexity of the application of non-execution clauses and of the conditionality 
of the ENP, it is now worth considering the positive functions of the HRC. 
  
The Positive Function of HRCs 
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 The positive function of HRCs, particularly in the Eastern AAs, can be asserted for a 
number of reasons.  
 Firstly, the idea that the negative function of the essential element clause is its central or 
only function, based on the judgment in Portugal v Council, needs to be revised.  The agreement 144
in this case did not contain a standard HRC, and the emphasis on the suspension function was 
justified due to the absence of a non-execution clause. In this connection, it has been suggested that 
much of what the Court decided on this matter does not apply to modern HRCs.  Reducing the 145
HRC to its suspension function also implies that one does not exist without the other, which is not 
validated by the pre-existing practice of the EU. Non-suspension mechanisms were a feature of EU 
agreements prior to the establishment of the HRCs,  and their function is much wider than merely 146
serving these provisions.  Most significantly, in Portugal v Council both the Court and the 147
Advocate General referred to the various EU declarations and documents,  highlighting the 148
positive aspects of human rights and democracy promotion in EU foreign policy.  Moreover, the 149
Court’s main finding, whereby the essential element clause “may be, amongst other things, an 
important factor for the exercise of the right to have [an] … agreement suspended or terminated…” 
can itself be seen as an indication of an alternative purpose of these clauses.   150
 Secondly, HRCs originally had a function of informing the relations between the parties as 
programmatic or basic principles. The “essential element” widened the hitherto positive function of 
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the HRCs by linking them to the rationale of art. 60 of the Vienna Convention. The non-execution 
provision therefore “complements” the essential element clauses,  rather than defines them. This 151
is supported by Fierro’s literal reading of the HRC, in which “the basis” and “the essential element” 
parts of the clause are separated by the word “and”  (a drafting technique replicated in the Eastern 152
AAs). 
 Thirdly, EU institutions have long acknowledged the importance of these provisions in 
creating conditions for positive engagement.  This has been part of a trend in political 153
conditionality since the 1990s, of complementing the negative/sanction approach with positive/
active measures,  providing “contextual support” for the positive function of HRCs.  The 154 155
Commission views HRCs as “instruments for the implementation of positive measures”, increasing 
the “visibility of [EU] initiatives”.  Most recently “[t]he principal value” of a HRC was seen in 156
the shared commitment to human rights and democracy.  Various commentators have also made a 157
case for the positive function of the HRCs taking into account the general political conditionality of 
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the EU.  In addition, the post-Lisbon legal framework demands active promotion of EU values 158
across all areas of external action, reaffirming the meaning of the HRCs as instruments of positive 
value promotion. 
 The positive function of HRCs can be also discerned from a particular policy framework. 
Bartels, for instance, contextualises the positive policy function of the HRCs in the Euro-Med 
Agreements within the Barcelona process, linking it to the political dialogue and to the 
establishment of bilateral subcommittees.  A similar link can be traced between the Eastern HRCs 159
and the ENP’s political conditionality as discussed above. The latter was not merely restricted to the 
parties non-breaching of recognised norms, but focused on active involvement in various projects, 
accession to international conventions, and so on. A similar rationale can be found in the specific 
provisions of the AAs on the fulfilment of treaty obligations,  which have been interpreted to go 160
beyond the negative duty of non-infringement to embrace a positive duty of implementation.  This 161
is reinforced by the ENP’s previous practice, in which positive actions were stipulated in the 
bilateral Action Plans to fulfil PCA obligations, including those related to democracy and human 
rights.  
 Furthermore, the HRCs should be linked to the objectives of the association mentioned 
previously. These not only describe the integration process, but also directly link the latter to the 
“common values’’ at its core.  Additionally, the Moldovan and Georgian AAs provide for the 162
separate objective of “contributing to the strengthening of democracy”, and tie cooperation in the 
area of freedom, security and justice to reinforcement of the rule of law and respect for human 
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rights and fundamental freedoms.  This obviates the need for enquiry into whether the preambular 163
references to the promotion of human rights and democracy are “assumptions on which the 
agreement is predicated or [...] genuine objectives”.  It can be argued that the reference to 164
common values as the basis of cooperation is linked to the essential element clause, highlighting the 
issues of utmost importance for the agreement, among which are certain EU values established in 
art. 2 TEU. In the Georgian and Moldovan AAs, which have a separate objective on strengthening 
of democracy, the essential element clause can be seen as a clarification of that objective by adding 
certain indicators.  
 Moreover, the location of the HRCs within the General Principles suggests that it underpins 
the rest of the agreement. Hence, the HRC can be viewed as an umbrella provision informing all 
other instruments deployed by the EU, rather than as “one of the instruments” promoting 
democracy and human rights. In this context, other relevant instruments, including the CFSP 165
political dialogues would be based on the essential element clause as their main normative 
framework. The HRCs thus represent the common shared objective of promoting democracy and 
human rights in the Treaty, all other provisions in the agreement being means to achieve this end. 
The objective of political dialogue in the Eastern AAs can be linked directly to the essential 
elements clause, as it provides for strengthening respect for democratic principles, rule of law and 
good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms.  While including these issues within 166
the political dialogue could be seen as adding more substance to the essential element clause,  the 167
converse is also true. The HRCs would normatively inform the political dialogue between the 
parties.  
 A similar positive link can be found in the provision on domestic reform whereby the 
internal policies of the parties should ensure respect for human rights, guarantee the stability and 
effectiveness of democratic institutions and rule of law, mirroring to a certain extent the HRC 
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content.  In the Georgian and Moldovan AAs, the call for domestic reform is much more detailed, 168
setting benchmark-like conditions for political reform, including judicial reform, law enforcement, 
and the fight against corruption.  This may reflect the European Parliament’s call to include such 169
benchmarks in other agreements in the region.  Although such benchmarking might not be ideal in 170
an open-ended agreement,  it may have been a means of departing from the previous ENP practice 171
of setting benchmarks in non-binding instruments. The link between such positive conditions and 
the HRC as a general principle providing the relevant normative framework is obvious. However, it 
is not clear whether appropriate measures can be taken for breaching these conditions, a suggestion 
made for future practice.  Finally, the positive function of the HRCs is also seen in the procedure 172
to allocate funding, whereby the AA provisions are part of the normative framework for allocating 
financial support under the ENP 2014-2020 financial instrument.   173
 Ultimately, this analysis suggests that a dual function should be ascribed to the Eastern 
HRCs. They have a positive function to inform the AAs, as well as other ENP instruments related to 
democracy and human rights, in the context of the ENP’s positive conditionality. Their negative 
function is exemplified by the non-execution clause, which does not diverge sufficiently from 
previous practice to address past criticism. However, it does include certain noteworthy variations 
that can be justified with reference to the ENP rationale. 
Conclusion 
 Art. 6 of EU-Ukraine AA. 168
 Art. 4 of Georgian AA, art. 4 of Moldovan AA.169
 S. 1(f), Resolution of the European Parliament on the negotiations of the EU-Armenia Association Agreement 170
[2013] OJ C258E. As regards Georgian and Moldovan AA, the Parliament’s resolution calls on providing “clear 
benchmarks for implementation of the Association Agreement” in general; see Resolution of the European Parliament 
of containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the 
negotiations of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement [2013] OJ C153E; Resolution of the European Parliament 
containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the 
negotiations between the EU and the Republic of Moldova on the Association Agreement [2013] OJ C51/E.
 Bartels, “The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and Investment 171
Agreements” (2014), pp. 15, 23-24. 
 Bartels, “The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and Investment 172
Agreements” (2014), pp. 23-24. 
 Art.3, Regulation 232/2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument [2014] OJ L77/27. 173
 29
  
 While reflecting the EU’s previous practice on HRCs, the Eastern AAs demonstrate that this 
practice is not set in stone. The standard model contains amendments to its essential elements and 
non-execution clauses. The scope of the essential elements clause is widened by the inclusion of 
additional elements and international instruments in its normative framework. In the case of 
Ukraine, the provision is also reflective of the political circumstances surrounding the signing of the 
relevant agreement. The three agreements demonstrate a novel practice of significantly expanding 
the General Principles beyond the essential elements, albeit in a somewhat arbitrary fashion as the 
distinctions between the Ukrainian AA and the Moldovan and Georgian AAs clearly demonstrate. 
The normative underpinning of the essential element clause indicates the most stringent standard in 
the neighbourhood to date, which might be explained by the level of political and economic 
proximity promised by the agreements.  
 The non-execution clause follows the now-standard distinction between taking appropriate 
measures in the event of general breaches of treaties and possible treaty suspension in cases of 
special urgency — replaced here by “exceptional circumstances” — for breaches of essential 
elements. In contrast to other treaty obligations, DCFTA obligations can be suspended in 
exceptional circumstances. This new practice is at odds with the EU’s previous record and is 
intended to deprive the parties of the ENP’s main incentive, the DCFTA. However, the negative 
application of the HRC clause remains unlikely, taking into account the scarce application of these 
provisions in the past. Moreover, the negative application would run counter to the very rationale of 
engagement through the ENP. The predominantly positive conditionality of the ENP, as well as the 
general trend in EU political conditionality, reveal an alternative, positive role of the HRCs. The 
content of the agreements, including their objectives, the provisions on political dialogue and the 
specific articles on political reform all reaffirm the positive functionality of the HRCs. The essential 
element clause provides the normative framework for any positive engagement in the domain of 
political reform and therefore underpins all other instruments deployed by the EU.  It is this positive 
function that should be regarded as the added value of these provisions, rather than the unlikely 
possibility of negative measures in the event of a breach. 
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